Πέμπτη, 29 Οκτωβρίου 2009

Αρχισαν πάλι τα όργανα στην Τουρκία


Τα όργανα άρχισαν να χτυπούν άσχημα στην Τουρκία καθώς ήρθε στη δημοσιότητα η επιστολή που έστειλε τούρκος εν ενεργεία στρατιωτικός του οποίου το όνομα δεν έχει γίνει γνωστό, με την οποία καταγγέλει ως αυτόπτης μάρτηρας τις προετοιμασίες για πραξικόπημα που έγιναν στην Τουρκία. Το πολύ ενδιαφέρον είναι ότι των σχετικών προασπαθειών ενήμεροι ήταν και ο προηγούμενος Α! ΓΕΕΘΑ Μπουγιούκανιτ και ο σημερινός Μπασμπούγ. Ο εισαγγελέας έχει καλέσει για ανάκριση όλο το ΓΕΕΘΑ. Το όλο θέμα παρουσιάζει τεράστιο ενδιαφέρον, καθώς ο κ. Ερντογάν δεν εμφανίζεται πολυπράγμων μόνο στο εξωτερικό αλλά έχει και μεγάλα ανοιχτά ζητήματα στο εσωτερικό. Σας παρουσιάζουμε παρακάτω την επιστολή του τούρκου στρατιωτικού προς τον εισαγγελέα στην αγγλική γλώσσα, όπως δημοσιεύθηκε στην τουρκική εφημερίδα ΖΑΜΑΝ.
Did Başbuğ know all along that the military conspiracy was real? The emergence of the original copy of a military plot aiming to undermine the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government and the faith-based Gülen movement has sent shockwaves throughout the country, with many circles gearing up to stand by democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.The original version of the plot was sent to İstanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Aykut Cengiz Engin by a military officer whose name was not made public along with a letter on October 15th. Since then, there have been heated debates over the content of the letter.

Below is an English translation of the letter so that our readers can make their own evaluations.
[THE INFORMANT’S LETTER ACCOMPANYING THE 'ACTION PLAN TO FIGHT REACTIONARYISM']

Esteemed prosecutor,
I am a military officer from a family proud of having served the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) for generations. However, a loss of reputation recently suffered by the TSK has disturbed me and my friends deeply. It is a bitter fact that our military, which gave confidence to its friends and fear to its enemies, has lost its credibility in the eyes of its own nation. Just as it is a fact that it is impossible to imagine a TSK that conducts psychological warfare against its nation, divides the society and takes a stance against the society’s values, it is a fact that the entirety of the TSK is not like this. Though I regret it now, I along with many friends took part in the formation of a junta which applied “psychological operations” to its own citizens in a way that could only be witnessed in Third World countries under the guise of a “debriefing activity” that appeared innocent and legitimate.
This formation, which was established for legitimate reasons and assigned the mission of applying psychological operations against the enemy, used the Psychological Warfare Unit as a tool. The resources and abilities of this distinguished establishment were used to create documents called “data records” to keep a record on everyone, including personnel in important positions such as governors, district governors, prosecutors and judges.
The institution was strained after the public learned of the junta’s illegal activities. It became necessary to change its name to the “Information Support Department” and limit its functions. As a result of ongoing present junta activities, in the most recent of a total four actions, the number of Information Support Battalions which would support all army commands including the Ege army command was reduced to one, impairing it from fulfilling its fundamental duty.
Some officers in the remaining last battalion have put aside their fundamental duties and continue to carry out illegal and covert duties assigned by the junta. As I stated above, with the positions they’ve occupied for years and the use of civilian extensions, enthusiasts of “seizing control of the country” — in other words “coup supporters,” or said differently “the junta organization” — have kept control over the country’s agenda and portrayed and continue to portray its activities to the public as if it is the “common view of the entire TSK.”
Personnel like myself who are aware of the junta’s organization and activities and are disturbed by it cannot find a platform to explain the facts and cannot make their voices heard.
With a so-called “protective approach,” there is an attempt to change the target by using themes such as “we are friends in arms,” “common enemies,” “we are a family” and “they want to weaken the TSK.” Alongside this so-called protective approach, personnel who know the truth and want to publicize it are silenced by “scare and assimilation” tactics. The mentality that “even if the arm breaks it must stay in the sleeve” is applied in many situations. The credibility of the TSK, which is left to conceal the junta’s dirty work, continues to be constantly damaged.
Those on duty in regions where events took place learned about TSK-related issues (assisting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK], drugs, record-keeping, assassinations, covert operations, etc.), which spread like a rumor and was known by society in general from the media.
However, myself and other friends who worked within the General Staff Information Support Department know what the media do not know; in other words we know very well the people that planned and executed these activities. As information support personnel, we were directly involved in the incidents (in Aktütün, Dağlıca, Poyrazköy, Çukurca and in many other places) and therefore have knowledge of the bare truth. Furthermore, we know each other very well as we’ve spent every moment together in our quarters and housing area starting from military school and even go on vacation together.
The Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism, which has occupied the country’s agenda for a long time and has even set the state’s institutions against each other, reveals that as in every previous case, again the junta is trying to destroy the entire values of the country for its own survival.
About the document in question, Air Instructor Maj. Hicri Dinçerol, who has had an active role here since the founding of the TSK’s psychological operation units and who served in the General Staff Information Support School Command until the general reassignments in 2009, said: “We had prepared this document. I don’t understand how it leaked?” This statement clearly shows that Dinçerol is a member of the junta and that the activities of the junta are not limited to the Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism.
Esteemed prosecutor,
Immediately after the Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism was published in the press, I acted quickly and secretly took the document in question from the file it was kept in. Initially there was a crisis when it was understood that the original document was not in its place. But then it was assumed that the document had been destroyed by a junta member who feared it would be found later. As a matter of fact, Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ made his statement to the press on the document only after he was convinced that the original was destroyed. As a military officer who has served in the TSK for many years, I would like to provide another service. On behalf of my country and people I believe it is my duty to send the document found in Addendum A to you for the sake of contributing to your devoted efforts.
Furthermore, in September 2007 I witnessed the Information Support Department’s commissioned staff colonels Dursun Çiçek, Sedat Özüer, İlker Ziya Göktaş and Fuat Selvi prepare various documents with the intent of directing public opinion under the auspices of then-General Staff Operations Commander Lt. Gen. Nusret Taşdeler with the support of several academics from universities and several politicians from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) administration, upon the order of Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Ergin Saygun.
The individuals mentioned above took part in various activities that had no legal basis concerning matters that exceeded the scope of their duties. To serve as an example, a plan prepared by the junta in question is presented in Addendum B. There is no signature on Addendum B because the document was sent electronically.
The illegal plans in question continued with increasing momentum during Gen. Hasan Iğsız’s tenure as deputy chief of General Staff, who is a key figure in the formation of the junta within the TSK. Upon the order of Gen. Iğsız to prepare an action plan that would yield immediate results, the necessary operations were launched with the contributions of Lt. Gen. Mehmet Ersöz and Maj. Gen. Mustafa Bakıcı, and the action plan in question was prepared by Col. Dursun Çiçek.
Esteemed prosecutor, a memorandum prepared by Col. Çiçek that categorized different civil society organizations was published in the Taraf daily on April 7, 2008. The General Staff headquarters launched an investigation after Taraf reported on the issue. A note that was prepared after the investigation was finished is presented in Addendum C. The note states that preparations for the memorandum started on July 29, 2004, upon the order of the General Staff headquarters and was presented to the related authorities in April 2006. In other words, the General Staff headquarters accepts the existence of the memorandum in question. No actions were taken against Col. Çiçek for the report.
After the Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism was published in the press, all computers that were used in the making of the document were wiped, related document were destroyed and the General Staff headquarters made an announcement denying the existence of such plans.
The destruction process was monitored directly by Gen. Saygun’s private secretary, Staff Col. Uğur Berksun, who went to the Information Systems Operations Unit and watched as the hard disks of computers numbered 30709, 33746, 40077, 27238, 27229 and 16693, which were used in the making of the action plan in question, were erased so any information on them could never be retrieved again. Col. Şükrü Kısadere, Lt. Erhan Sakallı, Lt. Kazım Bozkurt, Staff Sgt. Mustafa Urhan and civil servant Rifat Sülük took part in this process.
Esteemed prosecutor, the procedure that is applied under normal conditions when this kind of an event happens is this: Immediately after an incident is reported, Counterintelligence and Security unit personnel are summoned to launch an administrative investigation. They go to the Information Support Unit. No one except the department’s personnel is allowed inside. Each person is called into the room one by one and all cabinets are searched. All related or non-related computers are seized.
General Staff military prosecutors conduct simultaneous searches of suspects’ homes and confiscate anything necessary. A decision to launch an investigation is reached depending on the evidence that has been obtained. For example, last year in Ankara on suspicion of a breach of information security a court decision was quickly obtained and close to 40 homes in the Çiğiltepe housing area were raided. Military prosecutors searched homes, seized some computers and documents and took one person into custody. In a similar case in late May of this year, the homes, offices and cars of a group of Special Forces Command personnel were searched with great urgency and determination, and some people were taken into custody.
Esteemed prosecutor, I would like to summarize other developments that transpired at the General Staff headquarter after the Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism was printed in the media:
1) The General Staff heard of the incident after being informed by the General Staff’s Communications Office at 4:30 a.m., when the event was covered by the media in full.
2) Intelligence and Counterintelligence Office Chairman Gen. M. Mutlu Arıkan and the captain accompanying him have witnessed that branch chairmen other than Col. Dursun Çiçek were occupied with cleaning and destroying information and documents in Çiçek’s office when Arıkan and the captain accompanying him arrived in the Computing Support Office to investigate the incident.
3) On the same day, Col. Çiçek was asked by Gen. M. Mutlu Arıkan as to whether he had prepared the document. In a state of panic, Col. Çiçek denied the allegations, adding that this was not produced by his office. Gen. Arıkan, however, responded by saying: “This aside, I will show you a number of other similar documents prepared in the same way. You tell me how this was leaked.”
4) No court decision was issued with regard to this incident; no arrest was made, and no statement was taken. No serious investigation has been conducted to explore the source of the document.
5) When it became apparent that the civilian prosecutor would handle the case, Col. Çiçek’s computers, all servers and other relevant hardware and software were taken. These materials were cleaned up 35 times to make sure that the information on these devices would not be recovered. These were secretly carried out on June 19-21. The serial numbers of the cleaned computers are: 41440, 34218, 24187, 20245, 24159, 27861, 34331, 24251, 24040, 38534, 29595, 24551, 29653, 24532, 39198, 13924, 13920, 16118, 16110, 539337, 121561, 224259, 321609, 421624, 41510, 29816, 24045, 34359, 41520, 24362, 41401, 24749, 38537 and 24242. The computers and hard drives were sent to the prosecutor’s office after being formatted. Subsequently, these computers were replaced with computers from other departments.
6) Lt. Fatih Karacaer, who works at the General Staff’s School of Communication and Electronics Systems, and Lt. Berrin Şahin, who works at the Naval Forces Communication and Electronics Department, carried out the review and cleanup of the computers in Col. Çiçek’s office.
7) A search of Çiçek’s house was performed five days after the publication of the document in the media. To make sure that the search looked serious, General Staff Deputy Prosecutor Maj. İ. Volkan Şahin spent five hours in the house; however, he never searched anything. The military prosecutor made his stance clear when he got back to the office, saying, “This is how we protect our staff.”
Likewise, all paper shredders were brought together at the General Staff headquarters to do away with 40 stacks of paper that could be used to substantiate legal proceedings; the evidence was subsequently destroyed. All military and civilian staff employed in the cleanup process, including privates, were warned properly. The list of privates who took part in the destruction of the documents is presented in Appendix Ç.
9) A panel of experts headed by an experienced officer known for his specialization on irregular warfare was created to prove that the Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism prepared by Col. Çiçek and his team was not produced by the military; the panel completed a report in an attempt to convince people that the document was not authentic. However, the truth is not what is claimed by the panel of experts. Under the system at the … Information Support Department, documents with special contents (that are legally problematic in terms of the government, reaction, individuals, NGOs, etc.) have absolutely no inscriptions that indicate they belong to the TSK.
a. Different font styles and sizes are used.
b. No statement is used to indicate that the cover and the appendices are interrelated when both are brought together.
c. The appendices do not bear statements or items specific to the military code of correspondence; this can be observed and verified in correspondence between the General Staff and the intelligence agency and between the police department and civilians.
d. If annotations are to be hidden, the cover and notes are stored in different places so as to make sure the notes do not look like a military document; the determination of the relationship between an annotation and its cover is made via different methods by which the same number is given for the date, time, information note and the cover.
e. This means everyone is able to develop his or her own style in works such as the action plan and the information note.
10. Shortly after the leakage of the paper and the publication of the e-mail from Çiçek to retired Gen. Hurşit Tolon in the media, Gen. Hasan Iğsız issued an order on information security measures to prevent similar leaks.
The order states that security control numbers are to be printed three times on papers; the first is to cover the signature block and the signature, the second on the text and the third on the document number.
a. Computer-generated correspondence is not to include any information on the full name of the writer and his or her mission.
b. The signature is not to be scanned and inserted on a computer-generated document; the documents is to be sent electronically signed.
c. No name is to be given in e-mails.
d. The use of laptops and desktops connected to the Internet is to be limited in the headquarters.
This order shows that the publication of the document put the General Staff into a difficult position and that the relevant units wanted to take proper measures in an attempt to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents.
Dear prosecutor, I was involved in this work as a result of the efforts of the General Staff to prove that the paper prepared by Col. Çiçek and his team was not genuine with the assumption that the document was published to erode the military’s prestige. It is a dishonor in this case that the General Staff did not pay much attention to publications addressing the gravity of the paper while it had the opportunity to locate where it was produced and how it was disseminated. It also ignored the judiciary and asked for the punishment of those responsible for the leakage rather than establishing the authenticity of the paper.


Dear prosecutor, personnel who performed their duties were victimized through illegal means pursued by a junta team and were treated as offenders. However, the actual offender, Col. Çiçek, was taken under protection and subsequently assigned as a branch officer in the Naval Forces. Likewise, Gen. Mustafa Bakıcı got a promotion. Gen. Mehmet Eröz retained his status and position while Gen. Hasan Iğsız was assigned to a better position. Officers, noncommissioned officers and civil servants were assigned to non-office work and positions whereas Col. Çiçek was rewarded. The whole issue is not about Col. Çiçek; he is a pathetic man; what really matters is his position.
Dear prosecutor, the junta has not recognized the laws and legal system so far. When they feel that prosecutors like you will go after them, they resort to unethical methods to cover up their mistakes. They are trying to conceal the truth. Dear prosecutor, the people of this country appreciate your work and effort. They are aware that you are working tirelessly. Dear prosecutor, I am ready to respond to your call if you ask for my statements as a witness. I am hopeful and happy to see that the prosecutors of this republic are taking apart this junta.


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